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Abstract 
 
As trade integration deepens in East Asia, it is expected that there will 
be closer links in business cycles among East Asian countries.  
Theoretically, however, increased trade can lead business cycles across 
trading partners to shift in either direction: while inter-industry trade 
resulting in higher specialization would induce less synchronization, 
intra-industry trade could overturn this tendency.  By using the data for 
twelve Asian economies, this paper finds that intra-industry trade is the 
major channel through which business cycles become synchronized 
among Asian economies, although increased trade itself does not 
necessarily lead to close business cycle coherence. This result has 
important implications for the prospects of a currency union in the 
region. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The volume of trade in East Asian countries has continuously increased. The lowering 
of tariffs that started in the 1980s accelerated this trend of increasing trade worldwide.  
However, the growth in trade has been far speedier in East Asia than in any other region.  
A number of studies have observed that this rapid increase in trade is one of the key 
factors behind the region’s rapid growth in income.1 
Another important implication of increased trade is that countries involved with 
heavier trade integration are becoming more closely linked in macroeconomic 
performance.  Thus, the influence of important trading partners is now essential to 
understanding the business cycle fluctuations of domestic economies.  From a 
theoretical point of view, however, increased trade can lead business cycles across 
trading partners to be patterned in either direction – towards convergence or divergence.  
For example, if trade occurs mainly à la Heckscher-Ohlin or is of the Ricardian type, 
higher specialization would induce the industrial structures of the trading countries to 
diverge, resulting in less synchronized movements of business cycles.  In contrast, if 
                                            
1 For the effects of trade on growth, see, among others, Frankel and Romer (1999). 
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trade occurs mainly through intra-industry trade, this conclusion could be overturned.2   
    One of the main objectives of this paper is to empirically analyze how the 
business cycles of the Asian economies are influenced by increased trade within the 
region.  As the regional trade began accelerating in the 1980s, trade linkages seemed to 
have an increasing influence on business cycle co-movements.  As well, the possibility 
of free trade agreements in this region implies that this trend may persist even further.  
Assessing business cycle co-movements of Asian countries has another very 
important implication in terms of evaluating the benefits and costs of adopting a 
common currency within the region.  As pointed out in the seminal paper written by 
Robert Mundell (1961), the major cost of adopting a common currency is the loss of 
monetary independence.  In adopting a common currency, all member countries must 
yield their independent monetary policies to a supranational authority. When 
asymmetric macroeconomic shocks occur across the member countries, monetary policy 
cannot be tailored to an individual economy’s particular disturbances.  Hence it is less 
costly for the economies to form a common currency if their business cycles are 
synchronized.  In order to find potential candidates in the region for a currency union, it 
is necessary to be aware of the changing patterns of business cycle co-movements 
                                            
2 In section 2, we will explain the detailed mechanisms by which trade integration affects business cycle 
synchronization. 
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among the East Asian countries.3  In this sense, knowing how trade integration will 
shape business cycles patterns among East Asian countries is of tremendous importance 
in gauging the prospects for a currency union in the region. 
    This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the mechanisms by 
which increased trade affects the pattern of business cycle co-movements.  Section 3 
describes data and statistical findings.  Section 4 presents empirical analyses.  In Section 
5, we discuss the implication of our results on the prospects of a currency union in East 
Asia.  The last section concludes. 
 
 
2. Trade Integration and Its Implications for Business Cycle 
Synchronization 
 
Since trade is an important linkage between countries, many researchers have 
conjectured that it must play a crucial role in transmitting disturbances, influencing 
business cycle co-movements across countries.  However, on the question of whether 
                                            
3 Mundell (1973) presented a new view of currency union as a means of smoothing shocks by better 
reserve pooling and portfolio diversification. The possibility of international risk-sharing implies that 
similarity of shocks is not a strict condition for sharing a common currency if all members of the currency 
union are financially integrated and hold claims on each others’ outputs. This point has important 
implications for a debate about the size of a common currency area (Karlinger, 2002). 
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increased trade leads to more or less correlation of business cycles across countries, 
there is no consensus.  For example, Eichengreen (1992), Kenen (1969) and Krugman 
(1993) argued that as trade linkages increased, greater specialization of production 
would occur, resulting in less synchronization of business cycles. In particular, this is 
more so if business cycles are dominated by industry-specific technological shocks. 
  Frankel and Rose (1998) countered the above argument, insisting that if intra-
industry trade was more pronounced than inter-industry trade, business cycles would 
become more positively correlated as trade became more integrated.  As well, there are 
at least two additional important linkages that lead to a positive relation between 
business cycle co-movements and increased trade.  First, if demand shocks drive a 
boom in one country, the effects can spill over to trading partners through an increased 
volume of imports.  Second, increased trade may create a greater need for more 
coordinated fiscal as well as monetary policies, which synchronize policy shocks. Both 
of these linkages imply that increased trade leads to tighter business cycle co-
movements. 
In sum, the theoretical implications of trade integration on business cycle co-
movements are not unambiguous; to test the validity of the theories, an empirical 
investigation is in order.  Canova and Dellas (1993) investigated this issue and found 
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that there was some evidence of trade affecting the transmission of disturbances across 
countries but it was not robust to the choices of the detrending method.  Recently, 
Frankel and Rose (1998) found more positive results.  Based on 21 industrialized 
countries, they found that the more countries traded with each other, the more correlated 
their business cycles were.  That is, there is a strong positive relationship between the 
degree of bilateral trade intensity and the cross-country bilateral correlation of outputs.  
Following a similar method, Choe (2001) also finds that, based on ten East Asian 
countries, economic fluctuations are more synchronized as trade interdependence 
deepens in the region.  
These results suggest that, as countries trade more, it becomes more 
advantageous to form a currency union not only in terms of benefits but also in terms of 
costs.  This is what Frankel and Rose (1998) emphasized as the endogenous nature of 
the decision to join a currency union.  In other words, a naïve examination of historical 
data may give a misleading picture of a country’s eligibility for entry into a currency 
union since the economic structure is likely to change dramatically as a result of joining 
one.  The results of Frankel and Rose can be interpreted to support an early introduction 
of a currency union; it will also decrease the costs of adopting a currency union by 
lowering asymmetric shocks through increased trade.  Even a country that is not suited 
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ex ante to joining a currency union can be justified ex post facto in joining one due to 
lowered asymmetrical shocks.  
However, an important step is missing in this analysis.  Frankel and Rose 
(1998) conjectured that their results are due to intra-industry trade, but did not further 
try to identify the channel through which increased trade affects business cycle co-
movements.4  In this paper, by extending Frankel and Rose’s important contribution, we 
try to investigate how increased trade affects business cycle co-movements. 
We call the four different channels affecting business cycle co-movements (1) 
inter-industry trade, (2) intra-industry trade, (3) demand spillovers, and (4) policy 
coordination channels.  Only the first channel implies that increased trade leads to less 
synchronization of business cycles.  The last three channels have in common that 
increased trade induces more synchronization of business cycles.  
    While it is apparent in Frankel and Rose’s study that the first channel is not the 
one that facilitates convergence of business cycles, it is not clearly specified exactly 
which channel out of the last three channels drives their findings.  To find the answer, it 
                                            
4 In their empirical work, Frankel and Rose (1998) do not control for variables other than bilateral trade 
intensity.  Other researchers contend that controlling for sectoral similarity in the regressions lead to 
smaller coefficients on trade.  However, Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Otto, Voss, and Willard 
(2001) also control for industrial or sectoral similarity and the coefficients on trade are still statistically 
significant (Kose and Yi, 2002).  Following Heathcote and Perri (2002), Kose and Yi (2002) find that 
under international financial autarky the model can generate stronger correlations for pairs of countries 
that trade more, but the increased correlation falls far short of the empirical findings.  
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is necessary to consider these three channels separately and analyze how each one 
influences business cycle co-movements.  
Recently, Fidrmuc (2001) has shown that, based on a cross-section analysis of 
OECD countries between 1990 and 1999, convergence of business cycles relates to 
intra-industry trade, but there is no direct relation between business cycles and bilateral 
trade intensity.  Loayza, Lopez and Ubide (2001) analyze East Asia as a region and find 
significant short-run and long-run co-movement of business cycles.  They find that this 
co-movement is based on the countries’ highly similar trade structures.  Based on a 
panel regression, Shin and Wang (2002) also find that intra-industry trade is the major 
channel through which Korea’s business cycle becomes synchronized with that of 
eleven other Asian economies, although increased trade itself does not necessarily lead 
to close business cycle coherence.  These recent empirical analyses suggest that 
business cycle co-movements are strengthened only when increased trade is 
accompanied by more intra-industry trade (Imbs, 2002).  
In the next sections, we will investigate whether the findings from the case of 
Korea can be extended to other East Asian countries by identifying the most important 
channel leading to positive links between trade and business cycle co-movements in 
East Asia.  
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3. Data and Statistical Findings 
 
To measure output co-movements, annual data on real GDP are collected for twelve 
Asian countries over the period 1976-1997.  The countries considered are five East 
Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Taiwan), five ASEAN countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and two other Asian 
countries (Bangladesh and India).5   The period after 1997 is excluded because we 
believe that the data is distorted by the Asian crisis and, by including it, the 
conventional measure of business cycle co-movements could be exaggerated.6  All the 
data are drawn from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-Rom.  
    The trade volume data are collected from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
CD-Rom.  Industry-level trade data are available in Nicita and Olarreaga (2001), which 
reorganize the United Nations Statistics Department’s Comtrade database through the 
World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) software. The industry 
disaggregation in the database follows the International Standard Industrial 
                                            
5 Five other ASEAN countries are excluded due to lack of data. 
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Classification (ISIC) and is provided at the 2 digit level (9 industries), the 3 digit level 
(28 industries) and at the 4 digit level (81 industries) manufacturing industries only. The 
trade data includes both imports and exports, and mirror exports (reported by other 
trading partners) are obtained using WITS.  
Table 1 shows changes in real GDP and the volume of trade in East Asian 
countries for the period between 1977 and 1997.  The first column is the average growth 
rate in real GDP.  The figures show that this region was in the midst of rapid growth 
before the Asian crisis, with the average growth rate over 7% in China, Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Taiwan and over 6% in Hong Kong and Indonesia.  Japan, the 
Philippines and Bangladesh are exceptional cases with average growth rates lower than 
4 %. 
The second column is the average ratio of total trade (exports + imports) to 
GDP during the same period.  This ratio is quite high for this region and it is generally 
higher for faster growing countries.  We can see this by simply calculating the simple 
correlation coefficient between the first and the second columns, which turns out to be 
0.31.  This figure is consistent with a more formal analysis of the impacts of trade on 
growth done by, among others, Frankel and Romer (1999).  
                                                                                                                                
6 Recently Lee, Park and Shin (2002) have found, for the latter period, that co-movements of outputs in 
East Asian countries are much more pronounced when the Asian crisis period is included. 
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The third column is the average increase in percentage points for the ratio of 
total trade to GDP.7  This figure is positive in all countries except for Japan, which 
implies that total trade increased at a faster rate than GDP.  Therefore, trade becomes 
more important as the volume of GDP increases.  The fourth column is the ratio of 
regional trade to total trade.  The figure is on average 44.9%, which shows that regional 
trade is quite important.  Finally, the fifth column is the average increase in percentage 
points for the ratio of regional trade to total trade.  This figure is positive in all countries, 
which implies that, as time passes, regional trade becomes increasingly important for 
every country in the region. 
 
Insert <Table 1> 
 
To investigate how the bilateral trade intensity in each pair among the twelve 
Asian countries influences business cycle co-movements, we use three different proxies 
for bilateral trade intensity, following Frankel and Rose (1998): twx , twm  and twt . The 
first uses export data only, the second, import data, and the third, both export and import 
data.  The variables are defined as follows: 
                                            
7 For example, if the ratio increases from 10% to 30% for 20 years, then the average increase is 1 
percentage point.  
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where ijtx  denotes total nominal exports from country i to country j during period t; 
ijtm denotes total nominal imports from country j to country i during period t; and iX and 
iM  denote total global exports and imports for country i. A higher value of any of these 
indices indicates greater trade intensity between country i and country j.  
    A measure of intra-industry trade intensity is derived à la Grubel and Lloyd 
(1975). In constructing the measure, an important consideration is how detailed a 
classification of industries should be used.  If we want to measure trade in more 
homogeneous sectors, we need to further disaggregate industries.  However, as the 
industries are further disaggregated, the portion of intra-industry trade will shrink and 
eventually go to nil.  Rather than a priori determining a proper industry classification, 
we construct three measures based on two-, three- and four-digit industry classifications 
following the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).  The constructed 
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where Iijtx  is total nominal exports from country i to country j and 
I
ijtm  is total nominal 
imports from country j to country i.  Depending on how an industry is classified, we can 
have three measures: 2IIT  for two-digit; 3IIT  for three-digit; and 3IIT  for four-digit 
classifications.  Note that, since the second term on the right hand side in (4) decreases 
as more intra-industry trade occurs, we subtract it from 1 so that the index will 
monotonically increase as intra-industry trade increases. 
    Considering that any time-series change in trade patterns may influence the 
nature of business cycle co-movements, we divide the whole sample period into three 
sub-sample periods: 1976-83 (period 1), 1984-90 (period 2) and 1991-97 (period 3).  
We use two methods to derive cyclical parts of total real outputs by (1) first-differences 
in logarithms and (2) Hodrick-Prescott filter and then a simple correlation of the 
cyclical parts across countries is used as a proxy for business cycle co-movements.  
In <Table 2>, for each country, we report the average measure of output 
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correlation, trade intensity and intra-industry trade with the other Asian countries in 
each period.  The average correlation is based on a simple arithmetic mean for the 
correlation measures of each country with the other East Asian countries. For example, 
we calculate the correlation measures for Korea with each of the other eleven countries 
and use the mean as the measure for Korea.  The first column is based on first-
differences in logarithms and the second column, the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  The third 
and fourth columns are the mean of trade intensity for each country against the other 
East Asian countries.  The third column is a simple mean and the fourth column, a 
weighted mean using trade intensity measures as weights.  The fifth and the sixth 
columns are the means of the intra-industry trade measure for each country against the 
other East Asian countries.  The fifth column is a simple mean and the sixth column, a 
weighted mean using trade intensity measures as weights.  
 
Insert <Table 2> 
 
Interestingly, there is no clear evidence that there has been an increase in co-
movements of business cycles recently. 8   For both correlation measures, even for 
                                            
8 This fact is closely related to the fact that we have eliminated the period during the financial crisis and 
thereafter.  If we include the period, the co-movement of business cycles substantially increases. 
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countries where the correlation measure increases from period 1 to period 2, it decreases 
back in period 3. This indicates that, while there is some weak evidence of increasing 
co-movements of business cycles among East Asian countries in the early period, this 
pattern does not seem sustained.  On the other hand, trade intensity, whether based on 
exports, imports or total trade, has continuously increased.  This shows that, as time 
passes, Asian countries are increasingly becoming important trading partners to each 
other. Another interesting phenomenon is that the intra-industry measure, whether based 
on 2-digit, 3-digit or 4-digit industries, has also continuously increased.  
 
 
4. Methodology and Results 
 
    To more formally analyze this relationship, we set up the following equation 
and estimate the coefficients in the regression: 
 
1),( αατ +=jicorr * trade intensity 2),( ατ +ji * intra-industry trade ( , )i j τ  
+ 3α * fiscal policy coordination ( , )i j τ  + 4α * monetary policy coordination ( , )i j τ + ijτε   
 (5) 
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where τ),( jicorr  refers to the correlation of output between country i and country j 
during period τ .  For trade intensity, we used three measures, twx , twm  and twt , and 
for intra-industry trade, another three measures 2IIT , 3IIT  and 4IIT .  For fiscal policy 
coordination, we calculate the correlation of the ratio of budget deficit to GDP between 
country i and country j.  For monetary policy coordination, we consider the correlation 
coefficient of the M2 growth rates across each pair of countries. 
 Each term on the right hand side of equation (5) represents the channel through 
which increased trade influences co-movements of output across countries.  The first 
term, trade intensity, indicates how demand spillovers influence business cycle 
correlation.  Since demand spillovers increase as trade intensity increases, trade 
intensity can be used as a proxy of demand spillovers.  The second term, intra-industry 
trade, indicates how co-movements of output are influenced by intra-industry trade.  
The third and the fourth terms indicate how policy coordination, either fiscal or 
monetary policy, affect co-movements.  Finally, if increased trade is made mainly 
through inter-industry trade and if this channel dominates the other channels, then the 
coefficient of the first term should be negative.  In this way we can identify the most 
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important channel of trade influencing co-movement of outputs across countries. 9
 Frankel and Rose (1998) also estimated an equation similar to (5), but they 
included only the first term in their regression.  They pointed out that a simple OLS 
regression would generate a biased estimation due to an endogeneity problem.  This 
problem arises because countries are likely to link their currencies deliberately to those 
of their most important trading partners in order to capture gains associated with greater 
exchange rate stability.  That is, trading partners lose the ability to set policies 
independently of their neighbors and this tied policy coordination could result in a 
spurious association between trade intensity and business cycle co-movements.  They 
suggested using 1) log of distance; 2) a dummy variable for common border; and 3) a 
dummy variable for common language for instrumental variables.  
There are two problems in adopting their methodology to our case.  First, these 
instrumental variables are expected to be highly correlated to trade intensity, but not to 
intra-industry trade.  It is, however, difficult to find appropriate instrumental variables 
for intra-industry trade.  Second, our regression results are based on a panel regression 
that includes times series variations as well as cross-section variations.  Since these 
                                            
9 This approach cannot identify different ways by which various shocks influence the co-movements.  For 
example, some shocks originating from one country can have asymmetric effects on the other.  To fully 
incorporate the various aspects of the shocks, a structural model should be developed, which is beyond 
the analysis covered in the paper.   
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instrumental variables do not change over time, we cannot estimate all the coefficients 
of time-varying variables.   
Imbs (1998) suggests that the above problem cannot be solved through an 
instrumental variable estimation because the real problem is not an endogeneity 
problem but one of omitted variables.  He argued that, in a panel regression, unobserved 
components of time-invariable characteristics for each country can be handled by 
introducing fixed effects.  However, we believe that a panel regression with fixed 
effects cannot entirely solve the problem pointed out by Frankel and Rose.  To tackle 
the problem directly, we need to introduce the omitted variables that cause the spurious 
relationship between trade intensity and co-movements.  
In equation (5), we try to control the effects of policy shocks by explicitly 
considering two types of policy coordination. In measuring the degree of fiscal policy 
coordination, we first calculate the ratio of budget deficit to GDP for each country and 
then calculate the correlation coefficient of this ratio across each pair of countries. In 
measuring the degree of monetary policy coordination we follow similar steps: we first 
calculate the M2 growth rate for each country and calculate the correlation coefficient 
of the M2 growth rates across each pair of countries.10 
                                            
10 Clark and van Wincoop (2001) used a different proxy for policy coordination. They measured the 
difference in the monetary policy of two countries by the standard deviation of the interest rate 
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The regression results with cyclical parts generated by first-differences in 
logarithms are summarized in <Table 3>.11  In <Table 3-A>, the regression results from 
pooling the three periods are reported.  In columns 1 through 6, either trade intensity or 
intra-industry trade is used as a regressor.  In columns 7 through 9, both trade intensity 
and intra-industry trade are included as regressors. Since the results for intra-industry 
trade in columns 4 through 6 are very similar for the different measures of intra-industry 
trade, only 4IIT  is used for the measure of intra-industry trade in the estimation in 
columns 7 through 9. Indeed regression results using 2IIT  or 3IIT  instead of 4IIT  are 
very similar and hence not reported.  
    The regression results in <Table 3-A> indicate that, as expected, the estimated 
coefficient for trade intensity is positive and statistically significant either at 1% or at 
5%.  Furthermore the coefficient for intra-industry trade is also positive and statistically 
significant indicating a positive relationship between output correlation and intra-
industry trade.  However, when we include both trade intensity and intra-industry trade, 
the coefficient of intra-industry trade, though still positive, becomes statistically 
                                                                                                                                
differential and the difference in fiscal policy by the budget deficit differential.  In our case, the interest 
rate is not available for many countries and hence we used the monetary growth rate instead.  Further 
using the standard deviation instead of the correlation coefficient does not change our major results in 
Section 4. 
11 We have also performed the regression analyses with cyclical parts generated by the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter.  In this case the fitting of the model is generally poorer than in the case with first differences in 
logarithms and more coefficients are not statistically significant.  However the overall conclusions are 
similar.  These results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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insignificant.  The coefficients for policy coordination are of the right sign, but only the 
one for monetary policy coordination is statistically significant.     
   In <Table 3-B>, the results for a panel regression with fixed effects are 
reported. Compared to the OLS estimation with pooling, the estimation with fixed 
effects eliminates unobservable country-specific components and is more appropriate 
for analyzing the effects of time series patterns of trade.  In this case, the coefficient 
estimates for intra-industry trade are, in most cases, statistically significant at 10% and 
quite robust across different specifications. Furthermore, even after including the trade 
intensity measure, the estimates change very little, with the same level of significance 
maintained.  On the other hand, the coefficient estimates for trade intensity are not 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  Even when only trade intensity is used as a 
regressor, the coefficient estimates are in the right sign, but they are not statistically 
significant.  When both trade intensity and intra-industry trade variables are used as 
regressors, the coefficient estimates for trade intensity are still insignificant at 10%.  
Given that panel regression results generate a better specification of the model, 
our results suggest that intra-industry trade might be a major source of business cycle 
co-movements.  Unlike Frankel and Rose (1998), our results indicate that increasing 
trade itself does not induce synchronization of business cycles. Especially, if increasing 
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trade occurs mainly across different industries, it does not foster co-movements of 
outputs with trading partners.  
 
Insert <Table 3> 
 
We have also performed various robust checks against our specification and 
generally arrived at the same conclusion.12  First, one might argue that Japan is the most 
heavily involved in trade integration in the region and the exclusion of Japan would 
substantially weaken our results.  In <Table 4> the same regression results are reported 
with Japan excluded from the sample.  While <Table 4.A> leads to generally the same 
conclusion, contrary to our expectations, <Table 4.B> significantly enhances our 
arguments.  In  <Table 4.B>, whose specification is more favored than that of <Table 
4.A>, we find that the coefficients of intra-industry trade are significant even at 5% in 
columns 7 through 9 where trade intensity measures are included as well.   In contrast, 
the coefficients of trade intensity are not significant and t-ratios are generally lower than 
those in <Table 3>. 
 
                                            
12 As explained earlier, the general conclusion from the Hodrick-Prescott filter results is similar. 
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Insert <Table 4> 
 
Second, we further exclude Hong Kong and Singapore in our sample, because a 
considerable portion of trade for these countries is attributable simply to their 
intermediatiation of trade between other countries.  The regression results for this case 
are reported in <Table 5>.  While the significance is weakened as the sample size 
shrinks, generally the same conclusion is preserved: in <Table 5.B>, the coefficients for 
intra-industry trade are statistically more significant than those for trade intensity.  In 
this sense we can conclude that co-movements of business cycles are influenced more 
by intra-industry trade than the volume of trade itself.  
 
Insert <Table 5> 
 
 
5. Implications for a Currency Union 
 
The recent Asian currency crisis has induced Asian countries to seriously consider 
forming a common currency area as an alternative to the past soft-peg as well as the 
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current floating exchange rate regimes.  The successful launch of the euro in 1999 and 
its claimed benefits are also encouraging this movement.  For many developing 
countries in the region with common export markets, the fluctuation of their bilateral 
exchange rates critically affects the competitiveness of their exports.  Further, as trade 
integration among Asian economies accelerates, there will be more pressure, from 
inside, to enhance exchange rate stability among East Asian currencies.  By establishing 
a common currency area, these countries can stabilize their overall export 
competitiveness and enhance the benefits from further trade integration. 
 According to Rose (2000), membership in a currency union, ceteris paribus, 
more than triples bilateral trade among member countries. 13  This is true even after 
controlling for a number of other factors that might affect trade through the gravity 
model, which shows that trade between a pair of countries is proportional to their 
combined incomes, and inversely proportional to the distance between them.  These 
gains from trade are made even without decreasing trade with non-member countries.  
Since increasing trade by a factor of three is no easy feat, many people have questioned 
Rose’s estimate.  Despite the critics, Rose and his coauthors’ subsequent works suggest 
                                            
13 Rose (2000) emphasizes a phenomenon known as “home bias” in international trade – much more 
intense trade inside countries than between countries. McCallum (1995) quantifies the size of the intra-
regional bias at more than twenty to one, finding that trade between two Canadian provinces is more than 
20 times larger than trade between a comparable Canadian province/American state pair. Rose seems to 
regard this home bias effect as one of the main driving forces for increasing trade through currency union. 
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that the increase in trade due to a currency union would be substantial. 
Frankel and Rose (1998) emphasized that the fact that trade significantly 
increases after the formation of a currency union has important implications: the 
decision to join a monetary union has an endogenous nature.  In other words, a cursory 
review of historical data may give a misleading picture of a country’s eligibility for 
entry into a monetary union since the economic structure is likely to change 
dramatically as a result of joining the monetary union. Especially, increased trade 
affects the nature of co-movements among member countries, which is the most 
important element in gauging the costs of joining a currency union.  These results can 
be interpreted to encourage the early introduction of a monetary union; it will decrease 
the costs of adopting a monetary union by lowering asymmetric shocks through 
increased trade.  Even a country that is not suited ex ante to joining a monetary union 
can be justified ex post facto in joining one due to lowered asymmetrical shocks. 
However, our findings suggest that the above argument is not generally true: 
business cycle co-movements are strengthened only when increased trade is 
accompanied by more intra-industry trade.  Therefore, caution should be exercised in 
searching for appropriate partners for a currency union.  While trade may increase 
following a currency union, if the increased trade is mainly inter-industry trade, 
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business cycle co-movements can be weakened, making the currency union undesirable 
ex post facto. 
Most empirical studies widely confirm the hypothesis that measures of intra-
industry trade relative to inter-industry trade decline steeply as the distance between the 
trading partners increases. 14   In light of this finding, intra-industry trade among 
geographically neighboring East Asian countries should be high.  However, as shown in 
<Table 6>, the intra-industry trade index in East Asia was much lower than that of 
Europe in 1980: 31.3 vs. 60.8 for IIT-2, 22.6 vs. 52.0 for IIT-3 and 20.0 vs. 46.6 for IIT-
4.  This reflects the fact that the European countries had more homogenous industry 
structures in 1980 compared to East Asian countries.15  The index is monotonically 
increasing in both regions, but the speed is much faster in East Asia, so that the gap 
becomes much smaller in 1999: 56.1 vs. 67.9 for IIT-2, 51.1 vs. 58.9 for IIT-3 and 45.0 
vs. 52.3 for IIT-4.  This is good news for a currency union because trade in East Asia 
not only increases overall but it also occurs more and more within the same industries.  
If this tendency continues, then business cycle co-movements can be strengthened. 
                                            
14 See for example, Balassa (1986a, 1986b), Balassa and Bauwens (1987, 1988), Bergstrand (1983), 
Culem and Lundberg (1986), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), and Stone and Lee (1995). 
15 Rice, Stewart, and Venables (2002), by using the data of 22 OECD countries, find that closer countries 
tend to have more similar structures of underlying export supply and import demand, and as a 
consequence, intra-industry trade tends to be relatively high between close (and hence similar) countries.  
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When we examine individual countries, the intra-industry trade index is low in 
China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Thailand – below the average in the region.  
Furthermore, the index is increasing in most East Asian countries except for Hong Kong, 
China and Korea.  If this trend continues for these countries, then they are likely to have 
more asymmetric shocks over the business cycle, which may prevent them from joining 
a monetary union.  However, it is very difficult to predict how this trend will change in 
individual countries without analyzing what factors contribute to fostering inter- or 
intra-industry trade.  This will be a good subject for future research.   
 
Insert <Table 6> 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 Increasing trade among Asian countries induces a higher degree of economic 
integration within the region.  In this sense the business cycle of a country is expected to 
be continuously influenced by other economies in Asia, especially as trade within the 
region grows relatively more important. In particular, we have found in this paper that 
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intra-industry trade is the major channel though which the business cycles of East Asian 
economies become synchronized.   
 Unlike other studies in the literature, however, we find that increasing trade itself 
does not necessarily lead to more synchronization of business cycles. This has important 
implications in considering the adoption of a currency union.  We expect that the costs 
of joining a currency union will severely diminish only when intra-industry trade 
dominates afterwards. 
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Table 1. GDP Growth, Trade-GDP Ratio and Regional-World Trade Ratio 
 
 GDP growth T/GDP mean T/GDP growth R/W R/W 
  (%)  (%)  (% point) mean (%) Growth (%) 
BGD 3.9 24.6 0.9 30.3 1.2 
CHN 9.3 27 6.2 51.4 0.9 
HKG 6.6 234.1 4.1 53.6 1.4 
IDN 6.2 16.7 0.4 56.8 0.1 
IND 5 49.4 0.6 19.7 0.4 
JPN 3.3 21.2 -0.2 27.4 1.1 
KOR 7.2 64.6 0.3 36.4 0.4 
MYS 7.1 132 4.6 55.5 0.5 
PHL 2.8 59.3 3.3 40.2 0.7 
SGP 7.2 291.3 -1 48.1 0.7 
THA 7.1 64.3 2.4 46.1 0.4 
TWN 7.6 93 -0.05 73.8 1.7 
Average  6.1 89.8 1.8 44.9 0.8 
Note: 1. The values less than 1/10 are all dropped. 
 2. In most cases, the sample period is 1977 to 1997; For China, it is 1979 to 1997. 
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Table 2. On Sub-Sample Averages of the Variables 
 
  corr_y corr_y wt wt  IIT-4 IIT-4 
  (LD) (HP) (simple average) 
(weigted 
average) 
(simple 
average) 
(weigted 
average) 
BGD Period 1 0.1177 0.1697 0.0016 0.0004 0.029 0.0105 
 Period 2 -0.1 -0.25 0.0016 0.0006 0.0265 0.0172 
 Period 3 -0.2315 -0.1827 0.0018 0.0011 0.044 0.0207 
CHN Period 1 -0.244 0.0554 0.0172 0.0193 n.a. n.a. 
 Period 2 -0.2727 -0.3737 0.0233 0.0389 0.2102 0.1973 
 Period 3 0.1591 0.0805 0.0212 0.0314 0.2959 0.2273 
HKG Period 1 0.3562 0.1745 0.0182 0.0161 0.5714 0.1961 
 Period 2 0.1872 0.2211 0.0254 0.0461 0.5904 0.3192 
 Period 3 -0.0589 -0.0695 0.0324 0.0772 0.5733 0.3701 
IDN Period 1 0.3049 0.0984 0.0126 0.0228 0.0554 0.033 
 Period 2 0.2084 0.0509 0.0093 0.014 0.1475 0.0571 
 Period 3 0.2663 0.1755 0.0107 0.0111 0.2444 0.1047 
IND Period 1 -0.1248 -0.1589 0.004 0.0011 0.0618 0.0083 
 Period 2 0.1629 0.2912 0.0044 0.0014 0.1339 0.0236 
 Period 3 0.1024 0.0673 0.0044 0.001 0.2428 0.0504 
JPN Period 1 0.3506 0.1738 0.0199 0.0069 0.1281 0.0349 
 Period 2 0.0564 0.2637 0.0214 0.008 0.1729 0.0565 
 Period 3 -0.0954 -0.1932 0.0266 0.0128 0.2632 0.1111 
KOR Period 1 -0.0144 -0.0471 0.0009 0.0009 0.174 0.0899 
 Period 2 0.2251 0.2579 0.0011 0.0011 0.3218 0.1268 
 Period 3 0.0876 -0.0241 0.0016 0.0012 0.3192 0.1654 
MYS Period 1 0.2025 -0.1685 0.0134 0.0144 0.1822 0.1163 
 Period 2 0.3204 0.0663 0.0142 0.0159 0.2794 0.1957 
 Period 3 0.2637 0.1487 0.0171 0.0202 0.3875 0.2681 
PHL Period 1 0.2537 -0.2462 0.0048 0.0032 0.1263 0.0548 
 Period 2 0.268 0.3907 0.0046 0.0025 0.2222 0.1061 
 Period 3 -0.1281 -0.122 0.0057 0.0039 0.2821 0.1577 
SGP Period 1 0.1273 -0.2022 0.0235 0.0186 0.2321 0.1152 
 Period 2 0.3641 0.1876 0.0228 0.0196 0.3444 0.1813 
 Period 3 0.2888 0.1937 0.0259 0.0256 0.4195 0.2721 
THA Period 1 0.2598 0.101 0.0073 0.005 0.1228 0.0486 
 Period 2 0.2995 0.3445 0.0088 0.0066 0.165 0.0883 
 Period 3 0.2849 0.0793 0.0123 0.0117 0.3087 0.1748 
TWN Period 1 0.3935 0.163 0.0152 0.0158 0.177 0.1226 
 Period 2 0.0872 0.2214 0.016 0.0198 0.2455 0.183 
 Period 3 -0.0797 -0.1215 0.0201 0.0347 0.3387 0.293 
Note: The fractions are rounded off to four decimal places, before being transformed into a 
percent unit. 
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Table 3. The Effects of Trade Integration on Business Cycle Co-movements. 
 
3.A Pooled Regression 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
wx 4.183***      3.306**   
 (2.87)      (2.17)   
wm  3.071**      2.244*  
  (2.57)      (1.78)  
wt   4.022***      3.116** 
   (2.91)      (2.13) 
IIT_2    0.374**      
    (2.24)      
IIT_3     0.384**     
     (2.25)     
IIT_4      0.399** 0.291  0.312* 0.288  
      (2.27) (1.61) (1.72) (1.59) 
bd_corr 0.077 0.064 0.073 0.061 0.064 0.07  0.08  0.07  0.08  
 (1.15) (0.96) (0.90) (0.90) (0.94) (1.00) (1.18) (1.05) (1.15) 
m_corr 0.255*** 0.279*** 0.262*** 0.272*** 0.268*** 0.266*** 0.241*** 0.261*** 0.248*** 
 (3.24) (3.58) (3.37) (3.45) (3.39) (3.37) (3.06) (3.32) (3.16) 
# of obs. 166  167  167  163  163  163  163  163  163  
R^2 0.13  0.12  0.13  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.14  0.13  0.14  
Root MSE 0.42  0.42  0.42  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.42  0.42  0.42  
Note: (i) The dependent variable is output correlation between two countries for the three sub-sample periods, 1976-
83 (period 1), 1984-90 (period 2) and 1991-97 (period 3). The trade intensity measures, wx, wm and wt are 
defined as in equation (1), (2) and (3), based on exports, imports and total trade respectively. The intra-
industry trade measure, IIT_2, IIT_3, and IIT_4, are defined as in equation (4), based on ISIC 2, 3 and 4 
digit classifications. Two added regressors, bd_corr and m_corr are measures of the fiscal and the monetary 
policy coordination respectively. 
     (ii) The values in parentheses are t-ratios. The significance of the estimated coefficients are denoted by * 
indicating significance at 10 %, **, at 5 % and ***, at 1 %. 
 
3. B  Panel Regression: Fixed Effects 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
wx 8.640       6.247    
 (1.25)      (0.84)   
wm  5.133       5.384   
  (1.27)      (1.26)  
wt   9.100       7.665  
   (1.32)      (1.00) 
intrm_2    0.427       
    (1.22)      
intrm_3     0.632*     
     (1.72)     
intrm_4      0.800* 0.707  0.787* 0.704* 
      (1.94) (1.65) (1.91) (1.66) 
bd_corr 0.08 0.073 0.076 0.063 0.063 0.07  0.08  0.08  0.08  
 (0.92) (0.84) (0.88) (0.71) (0.72) (0.79) (0.89) (0.88) (0.90) 
m_corr 0.093  0.102  0.097  0.090  0.090  0.084  0.087  0.093  0.088  
 (0.99) (1.09) (1.05) (0.93) (0.94) (0.88) (0.91) (0.98) (0.93) 
# of obs. 166  167  167  163  163  163  163  163  163  
overall 
R^2 0.09  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.10  0.08  0.09  
sigma_e 0.40  0.40  0.40  0.41  0.41  0.41  0.41  0.40  0.41  
Note: See the note to Table 3.A. 
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Table 4. The Effects of Trade Integration on Business Cycle Co-movements (Japan 
excluded) 
 
4.A Pooled Regression 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
wx 4.754***      3.785**   
 (3.21)      (2.43)   
wm  3.029**      1.976   
  (2.41)      (1.47)  
wt   4.25***      3.193** 
   (2.90)      (2.10) 
intrm_2    0.374**      
    (2.17)      
intrm_3     0.448**     
     (2.51)     
intrm_4      0.44** 0.302  0.35* 0.309  
      (2.43) (1.62) (1.84) (1.64) 
bd_corr 0.116  0.092  0.106  0.096  0.104  0.107  0.121* 0.105  0.114  
 (1.62) (1.28) (1.48) (1.31) (1.42) (1.45) (1.67) (1.43) (1.56) 
m_corr 0.238*** 0.267*** 0.247*** 0.276*** 0.273*** 0.268*** 0.23*** 0.255*** 0.239*** 
 (2.81) (3.16) (2.93) (3.26) (3.23) (3.17) (2.72) (3.01) (2.82) 
# of obs. 144  145  145  141  141  141  141  141  141  
R^2 0.15  0.13  0.14  0.12  0.13  0.12  0.16  0.14  0.15  
root MSE 0.42  0.42  0.42  0.42  0.42  0.42  0.42  0.42  0.42  
 
4. B Panel Regression: Fixed Effects 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
wx 7.962       4.294    
 (1.09)      (0.55)   
wm  6.193       6.956   
  (1.41)      (1.51)  
wt   9.915       7.779  
   (1.32)      (0.93) 
intrm_2    0.611*      
    (1.68)      
intrm_3     0.877**     
     (2.27)     
intrm_4      1.077** 1.015** 1.086** 0.991** 
      (2.50) (2.27) (2.54) (2.25) 
bd_corr 0.104 0.097 0.098 0.086 0.081 0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  
 (1.08) (1.02) (1.32) (0.89) (0.84) (0.94) (0.98) (0.99) (0.99) 
m_corr 0.055  0.061  0.057  0.050  0.048  0.036  0.040  0.043  0.039  
 (0.53) (0.59) (0.56) (0.47) (0.46) (0.35) (0.38) (0.42) (0.38) 
# of obs. 144  145  145  141  141  141  141  141  141  
overall 
R^2 0.12  0.08  0.10  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.10  0.08  0.10  
sigma_e 0.41  0.41  0.41  0.41  0.41  0.40  0.41  0.41  0.40  
Note: See the note to Table 3.A 
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Table 5. The Effects of Trade Integration on Business Cycle Co-movements (Japan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore excluded) 
 
5.A Pooled Regression 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
wx 5.335       4.391    
 (1.64)      (1.34)   
wm  0.870       -0.644   
  (0.30)      (-0.22)  
wt   5.566       3.754  
   (1.39)      (0.90) 
intrm_2    0.341       
    (1.61)      
intrm_3     0.469*     
     (2.03)     
intrm_4      0.506* 0.453* 0.52* 0.445* 
      (1.99) (1.77) (1.97) (1.69) 
bd_corr 0.067  0.060  0.058  0.054  0.053  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.05  
 (0.79) (0.69) (0.69) (0.63) (0.62) (0.59) (0.64) (0.61) (0.58) 
m_corr 0.27*** 0.289*** 0.275*** 0.272*** 0.263*** 0.25** 0.239** 0.248** 0.245** 
 (2.73) (2.91) (2.78) (2.72) (2.64) (2.48) (2.37) (2.44) (2.43) 
# of obs. 111  112  112  110  110  110  110  110  110  
R^2 0.10  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.13  0.11  0.12  
root MSE 0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  
 
5. B Panel Regression: Fixed Effects   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
wx 6.795       1.279    
 (0.65)      (0.12)   
wm  6.739       6.707   
  (1.25)      (1.23)  
wt   16.779       9.051  
   (1.22)      (0.60) 
intrm_2    0.430       
    (1.09)      
intrm_3     0.703*     
     (1.67)     
intrm_4      0.817* 0.798  0.829* 0.708  
      (1.70) (1.56) (1.73) (1.37) 
bd_corr 0.039 0.036 0.046 0.022 0.017 0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04  
 (0.34) (0.32) (0.41) (0.20) (0.16) (0.22) (0.24) (0.31) (0.32) 
m_corr 0.086  0.092  0.096  0.074  0.075  0.063  0.065  0.075  0.073  
 (0.70) (0.78) (0.81) (0.61) (0.62) (0.52) (0.53) (0.62) (0.60) 
# of obs. 111  112  112  110  110  110  110  110  110  
overall 
R^2 0.07  0.02  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.05  0.08  
sigma_e 0.41  0.41  0.41  0.42  0.41  0.41  0.41  0.41  0.41  
Note: See the note to Table 3.A 
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Table 6. Trends of Intra-Industry Trade in East Asia and Europe (percentage) 
 
  1980   1990   1999  
 IIT-2 IIT-3 IIT-4 IIT-2 IIT-3 IIT-4 IIT-2 IIT-3 IIT-4 
East Asia          
China 17.7 14.2 13.5 60.7 55.8 51.7 45.8 42.7 39.0 
Hong Kong 45.1 42.2 41.1 58.4 57.1 55.8 56.8 56.6 56.5 
Indonesia 33.6 6.7 5.8 34.1 17.2 13.6 44.9 36.1 26.0 
Japan 29.8 18.4 16.4 37.5 30.3 28.2 56.4 49.3 41.0 
Korea 35.8 30.2 28.2 44.4 40.1 37.9 43.4 36.0 32.8 
Malaysia 39.6 27.3 23.1 48.6 44.1 40.1 68.9 64.9 56.5 
Philippines 23.4 19.3 14.9 41.8 30.4 25.8 59.9 54.7 45.2 
Singapore 34.2 25.5 22.3 57.9 47.2 42.4 74.1 68.2 61.9 
Taiwan 23.1 17.8 12.2 32.0 30.0 26.0 60.4 56.4 48.1 
Thailand 30.3 24.6 22.0 41.3 37.3 34.3 49.9 46.6 42.7 
Average 31.3 22.6 20.0 45.7 38.9 35.6 56.1 51.1 45.0 
          
Europe          
Austria 60.4 52.7 47.1 70.5 60.2 53.5 71.2 63.5 56.9 
Denmark 58.7 50.8 44.4 66.9 56.5 49.5 72.0 63.0 53.8 
Finland 49.7 43.4 40.5 59.0 54.0 48.9 63.6 51.1 45.4 
France 78.2 65.9 60.0 79.3 71.2 64.3 79.4 71.7 66.1 
GBR 74.9 66.8 61.1 79.1 72.3 65.5 83.2 74.3 65.9 
Germany 67.1 62.7 59.4 71.6 68.0 64.5 71.1 68.2 64.1 
Greece 42.6 22.0 16.5 39.1 30.5 23.2 32.4 26.1 21.0 
Ireland 60.4 55.0 45.7 71.6 62.9 51.9 69.5 58.3 49.3 
Italy 71.4 58.4 52.9 69.7 60.6 53.9 72.4 63.9 56.2 
Netherlands 70.7 63.0 55.9 73.3 65.8 58.9 70.8 62.3 56.7 
Norway 58.4 50.6 46.3 65.1 52.5 47.6 64.5 48.4 43.2 
Portugal 32.4 26.4 21.2 45.8 40.3 32.7 54.9 49.0 40.7 
Sweden 65.9 58.4 54.7 71.9 64.1 59.3 77.3 66.2 61.1 
Average 60.8 52.0 46.6 66.4 58.4 51.8 67.9 58.9 52.3 
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